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Abstract
We analyze the e¤ect of accounting biases on the prots of rms that compete in
a Cournot product market. We nd accounting biases strictly decrease rmsprots
when the rms are fully equity-nanced. However, di¤erent results emerge when we
introduce debt into the rmsnancial structures. Firms must report interim account-
ing signals, on which their debt covenants are based. We contrast rmsprots under
an unbiased accounting system, a conservative accounting system and an aggressive
accounting system. Conservative accounting system increases the likelihood of debt
covenant violations and rm liquidation. Interestingly, the increased likelihood of liq-
uidation could make the borrowing rms better o¤ by turning the surviving rm into
a monopolist that captures the entire market share. In addition, conservative account-
ing bias gives the banks more decision rights in liquidating or re-organizing the rms
operations, thus reducing the "excessive liquidation" problem. Absent renegotation,
conservative accounting system improves the bankspayo¤s.
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I. Introduction
Most debt covenants are based on accounting information1. This fact suggests account-
ing is likely to play an important role when debt is present. In this paper, we demonstrate
how accounting practices could inuence the structure/organization of an oligopolistic prod-
uct market through the debt borrowed by the competing rms. This e¤ect arises primarily
through the banks liquidation decision, which is based on the accounting signals reported by
the borrowing rms. The accounting bias contained in a rms reported signal could cause
the rm to be inappropriately liquidated (or continued), thus changing the competitive na-
ture of the whole industry.
Prior studies have examined the impact of product market competition on accounting
disclosure, the impact of product market competition on debt, and the impact of debt on
accounting disclosure. However, to our knowledge, no study has looked at all of these three
components together in a single setting. We thus contribute to the existing literature by
showing how accounting disclosure could a¤ect product market competition through debt.
As our analyses show, this e¤ect is non trivial. Banksliquidation decisions can change a
product market from a duopoly into a monopoly, or even completely shut down the market.
Accounting reports are the information the banks use to make such liquidation decisions.
Depending on the direction of accounting bias and the demand function of the market,
accounting bias can lead to excessive-liquidation (or excessive-continuation) of the rms
in the product market. However, the over-liquidation does not necessarily cause the debt-
e¢ ciency to go down. In fact, accounting bias can actually increase the total expected payo¤
of the banks and borrowing rms to a level higher than that under an unbiased accounting
system. Thus, the banks and the borrowing rms competing in an oligopoly may prefer an
accounting regime with deliberate bias.
We investigate the e¤ect of accounting bias on imperfect product market competition
1For example, Demerjian (2011) examines 100 randomly-selected private debt covnants, and found 96 use
income statement -based information and 68 use balance sheet-based information.
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through debt. We analyze two rms that compete in an imperfect product market in Cournot
fashion. Both rms borrow from banks to nance their operations. The rms are subject to
an externally imposed accounting system that may have a conservative or aggressive bias.
After the rms learn their cost information, they must provide a public report following
the requirements of the accounting system. The rmsdebt covenants with the banks are
also based on the accounting reports. When a good signal is reported, the rms control
rights remain in the hands of the rm owner/manager. When a bad signal is reported,
the rm is taken over by the creditor. A conservative accounting system thus provides the
creditor with more decision rights than an aggressive accounting system by triggering debt
covenant violation earlier. While the rms owner/manager always prefers to continue the
rms operation and cannot reduce "false negative" error, the creditor can reduce "false
positives" by not always terminating rms with bad reports.2
We rst show that accounting bias decreases the rmspayo¤s in a debt-free world.
Compared to the benchmark of an unbiased accounting system, the rmsexpected prots
are strictly lower under the conservatively or aggressively biased accounting systems. We
then proceed to a conservative setting where the rms are forced to sometimes report a bad
signal when the true cost is good. The consequence of such conservative accounting bias
is excessive liquidation as the rmsdebt covenants are easily violated. However, the rms
may actually benet from this increased frequency of convenant violation. In an imperfect
product market, one rm being shut down means the market share is transferred to the
surviving rival. Thus, it is possible for the remaining rm to earn higher prot due to
the change in the market structure. We show when the potential increase in rm prots
due to the market structural change outweighs the potential loss of prots due to excessive
liquidation, the rms are actually better o¤ under conservative accounting system.
Further, the banks take over the control rights of the rms when a covenant violation
2We consider the borrowers potential bankruptcy risk as the primary concern of the bank, thus false
negative refers to the error when a rm is reported as good but is actually a bad type; while false positive
refers to the error when a rm is reported as bad but is actually a good type.
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is triggered by bad cost reports. The banks then have the option of immediately liquidating
the rms, or re-organizing the rms and letting them continue operations.3 If the banks
randomly liquidate the rms with bad cost reports, there would be a Pareto improvement
to all players payo¤s. Since we assume a zero-prot constraint on the banks, the gains from
the random liquidation would be passed over to the rms, thus lowering the rmsinterest
rates and increasing their expected prots.
Under an aggressive accounting system, the rmspayo¤s are generally lower than that
under an unbiased accounting system. With aggressive accounting bias in the cost report,
the debt covenant is less likely to be violated. On the contrary, there is a higher likelihood of
rms that should have been liquidated being allowed to continue. Thus, the rmsexpected
prots are generally lower due to more intense competition.
The intuition behind accounting conservatism leading to possible higher payo¤s lies in
the conservative biasrole in softening Cournot competition. With a conservative account-
ing system, the competing rms are sometimes forced to abandon the market through bank
liquidation. The surviving rm then gets to capture the entire market share. The banks
thus indirectly play a role in mitigating market competition between the rival rms. Aggres-
sive accounting system does the opposite. It exacerbates the situation by inducing ercer
competition. The playerspayo¤s are therefore lower.
Another interesting case arises when the same bank lends to both competing rms. In
the context of Cournot competition, the bank can decide which rm to liquidate and which
rm to allow to survive, when both rms report bad signals. The bank thus e¤ectively turns
the surviving rm into a monopolist, which then generates enough prot to pay back the
debt. Since the bank only has decision rights when the reported signal is bad, conservatism
serves to facilitate the control over the market and reduce the risk faced by the creditor.
Again since the bank earns zero-prot, the extra gain from conservative accounting is passed
3In the U.S., a rm can choose to le Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy. With Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
the rm is immediately liquidated; while with Chapter 11 bankrupcy, the rm is re-orgnized and allowed to
continue with operations.
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onto the borrowing rms through decreased interest rate.
The setup of our model is standard. We assume the nature of the product market
competition is Cournot with perfectly substitutable products. We follow Venugopalan (2001)
and Li (2009) in characterizing accounting conservatism, which is exogenously given in the
model. When the accounting system is conservative, a good signal is perfectly informative
while a bad signal is noisy. When the accounting system is aggressive, a bad signal is
perfectly informative while the good signal is noisy. These denitions are also consistent
with the interpretation of conservatism by most empirical work such as Basu (1997). We
assume perfect competition in the banking market, thus our representative bank faces a
zero-prot constraint.4
We do not intend to endogenously derive the optimal level of conservatism in a single
rm setting. Rather, we examine the impact of conservatism that is exogenously imposed.
We also do not explain the existence of debt. The demand for debt is assumed rather
than derived. Our goal in this paper is to show the presence of debt a¤ects the interaction
between accounting conservatism and rms operating decisions in an imperfect product
market setting. Conservatism provides the creditor with additional tools for reducing the
lending risk associated with asymmetric information on the borrowers type; thus improves
lending e¢ ciency and reduce interest rate.
Our paper is related to three areas of research. The rst area is the impact on accounting
disclosure of imperfect product market competition (without the presence of debt). Several
studies present related research ndings in di¤erent settings. Darrough and Stoughton (1990)
show threat of entry may provide rms with incentives to disclose information. Darrough
(1993) examines rmsreporting behavior when engaged in Cournot or Bertrand competition.
Wagonho¤er (1990) studies a rms optimal voluntary disclosure strategy when facing a
strategic market rival, and nds such disclosure may increase the rms product price while
4The zero-prot constraint is not critical in obtaining our main results. When the banks are allowed to
maximize their own payo¤s, they would not transfer all extra payo¤ to the borrowing rms. The banks thus
would demonstrate a strict preference to a conservative accounting system.
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simultaneously imposing a proprietary cost on itself. Bagnoli and Watts (2010) also examine
how rms bias their accounting reports when competing in a Cournot fashion and the e¤ect
of accounting bias on the rmsproduction decision.
A second area of literature focuses on capital structure and imperfect product market
competition. Brander and Lewis (1986) show a rm competing in an oligopolistic market
behaves more aggressively when it has higher debt, thus the whole industry settles on an
equilibrium with the excessive debt in the rmsnancial structure. Clayton and Jorgensen
(2005) examine the strategic e¤ect of cross-holding of competing rms on their product
market competition. Hughes and Kao (1998), Hughes and Williams (2008) analyze how
nancial structure can be used as a commitment device in oligopolistic competition.
A third area of research our paper relates to is how debt contracting a¤ects accounting
behavior. Specically, there is a recent stream of literature focusing on debt contract e¢ -
ciency and accounting conservatism. Venugopalan (2004) models accounting conservatism as
a systematic bias to put more weight on bad news. He shows conservatism does not improve
debt contracting e¢ ciency. Gigler et al. (2009) extend the Venugopalan study to a more
general setting and characterize the statistical nature of conservatism, showing the same
result. Li (2009) incorporates the possibility of debt renegotiation. She shows conservatism
may marginally increase the borrowers welfare when renegotiation is allowed, provided the
renegotiation cost is neither too high nor too low.
We build on and extend these prior studies, but also di¤er from them in our modelling
setup. For example, our rms do not control the disclosure of their cost reports. The cost
reports are produced by an externally imposed accounting system, and the rms do not have
discretion in the reporting process. Further, we assume the rms cannot communicate its
true cost except through the accounting report. That is, the rm may know the accounting
report carries a bias, but is not able to report the "true" cost through other channels. The
rmsonly strategic decision is on production quantity. Also, the banks in our model are
strategic in their liquidation decisions. Upon receiving a bad cost report, the banks take
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over the decision rights of the rm. Conditional on the reports received, the banks may
choose to liquidate a rm, continue a rm, or even choose to randomly liquidate a rm.
This setup di¤ers from Brander and Lewis (1986), in which rms are never liquidated before
production. It also di¤ers from Venugopalan (2004), Gigler et al. (2009), in which rms are
always liquidated when bad signals are given. Further, we do not allow the rms and banks
to renegotiate, as in Li (2009) . The banks in our model may choose to not liquidate a rm
with bad cost reports, but the rms always choose to continue despite the true production
cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
presents the analyses and results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
II. The Setup
We examine the interaction between two rms i and j and their creditor(s). The two
rms compete in Cournot fashion. As the focus of this paper is not the rms optimal
nancial structure, we assume their operations are fully debt-nanced. For each rm, the
bank loans an amount of initial cash of I, and the face value of the loan for each rm is D.
The linear inverse demand function for the rms is P = a   Qi   Qj, where P is the
unit price for the product, Qi and Qj is the quantity produced and sold by each rm i or j,
a is the intercept of market demand, with a > 0. The rm is marginal cost Ci is its private
information. We assume Ci 2 fcg; cbg, with cb > cg > 0. The probability of the rm having
a low marginal cost Ci = cg is , while the probability of the rm having a high marginal
cost Ci = cb is 1  . The marginal costs of rm 1 and 2 are independent. Each rms prot
is i = Qi(P   Ci).
Upon privately observing its own cost, each rm simultaneously discloses a signal of
cost bCi 2 fbcg;bcbg to the public. The report is observed by everyone, including the bank
and the competitor. The signal may be biased by containing a certain degree of accounting
distortion. When both rms simultaneously decide the quantities of their outputs, rm i
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maximizes its prot conditional on the realized value of its own cost Ci, its cost report, and
its competitors cost report. That is, the prot function for rm i is
(1) i = i

Ci; bCi; bCj = E(Qi(a Qi   E(Qj)  Ci)):
The bank(s) and the rms use the cost signals for their debt covenants. If rms reported
cost signal is good, the rms manager retians the decision rights of the rm. If the signal is
bad, the bank takes over control rights and can liquidate the rm if needed. The reported
cost signal is subject to the external accounting system. We model the rms accounting
system through two variables  and  that represent the rmsreporting requirements, with
 2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 1]. Nature takes the rst move, and decides whether rm is cost is cg
or cb. A report is then produced by an exogenously determined accounting system. There
are three di¤erent accounting systems: unbiased, conservative and aggressive. An unbiased
accounting system is dened as generating a cost report consistent with the true cost with
probability 1. A conservative accounting system is dened as generating a downward bias.
Specically, it generates a bad cost report with probability 1 when the true cost is bad;
but generates a good cost report with probability  (and a bad cost report with probability
1   ) when the true cost is good. An agressive accounting system is the opposite of the
conservative accounting system, generating a good cost report with probability 1 when the
true cost is good, and a bad cost report with probability  (and a bad cost report with
probability 1   ) when the true cost is bad. We denote the posterior probabilities of true
cost being consistent with the report as Pr [cgjc^g] =  and Pr [cbjc^b] = :5
5Essentially, the setup is similar in spirit to that of Venugopalan (2001). While his denition of accounting
bias can go both directions, we restrict the bias in our systems to be distinctively one way.
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Figure 1. Illustration of di¤erent accounting systems
The accounting systems in our model can only bias accounting reports in one direction.
That is, the conservative system only generates downwardly biased report and the aggressive
system only generates upwardly biased report. The degree of bias is captured in the variables
 and . Specically, the lower  the more conservative the conservative system is, and the
higher  the more agressive the agressive system is. Note that the case of agressive accounting
systemis not a prevalent phenomenon in practice. We nevertheless examine it for the sake
of completeness. The posterior probabilities under the three accounting systems are dened
as:
Unbiased System:  = 1  = 1
Conservative System:  = 1  = 1 
(1 )+(1 )
Aggressive System:  = 
+((1 ))  = 1
The sequence of the game is as follows. At time 0, the rms borrow the needed cash
from the bank(s). At time 1, nature reveals the rmsmarginal costs, which can only be
observed by the rms themselves. Each rm discloses a public signal that is generated by
the rms accounting system. The signal is observed by both the bank and the competitor.
The rms decision rights are controlled by the rm if the reported signal is good, and by the
bank if the reported signal is bad. At time 2, the bank makes its decision to either continue
or terminate the rms operations. Thus at time 3, there are three possible outcomes. If
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both rms are terminated, then there is no market. If only one rm survive, it becomes a
monopoly. If both rms survives, there is Cournot competition. At time 4, the rms make
respective quantity decisions. At last, payo¤s are then realized for all parties involved at the
end.
In the next sections, we analyze the role of the accounting system in several variations
of the model described above. To establish a baseline, we rst examine the impact of the
accounting systems on rms payo¤s in a debt-free environment. Then we examine the
accounting e¤ect when two rms each borrow debt from two independent banks. The third
case we investigate is when the two competing rms borrow from the same bank. In each
of these cases, we contrast the results from an unbiased accounting system with that from a
conservative system and an aggressive accounting system.
III. Equity Financing
We rst examine the case when rms are fully equity-nanced. Since there is no debt,
there is no need for the bank. As described above, the two rms have the same binary cost
realization. They then provide cost reports to the public. Finally the two rms compete
based on the information they have.
A. Unbiased Accounting System
Suppose the rmstrue costs have to be reported without any bias. That is, a good
cost is reported as good with 100 percent probability, and a bad cost is reported as bad with
100 percent probability. It is in e¤ect equivalent to rmstrue costs being public knowledge.
Since there is no imperfect information, we simply denote the rm prot as a function of its
own cost and the competitors cost. For example,  (cg;cg) refers to rm prot when its own
cost and its competitors cost are both good. There are four possible levels of prot for rm
i:
1. With probability 2; both rms have good cost realizations, and the rm prot from
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Cournot competition is  (cg;cg) =
(a cg)2
9
.
2. With probability (1  )2 ; both rms have bad cost realizations, and the rm prot
from Cournot competition is  (cb;cb) =
(a cb)2
9
.
3. With probability  (1  ) ; rm is own cost is good and the competitors cost is bad,
and rm prot is  (cg;cb) =
((a cg)+(cb cg))2
9
.
4. With probability  (1  ) ; rm is own cost is bad and the competitors cost is good,
and rm prot is  (cb;cg) =
((a cb) (cb cg))2
9
.
The total expected prot E (unb:) for rm i is simply the weighted average of the above
values.6
B. Conservative Accounting System
Now we examine the case when the two competing rms are subject to an accounting
system with conservative bias. Under conservative accounting system, the rms must report
bad cost when the true cost is bad. But when the true cost is good, the rm may report
good cost with probability  and report good cost with probability 1  . A rms prot is
a function of its own cost, its reported cost and its competitors reported cost. We denote
a rms prot and production quantity accordingly. For example,  (cg;bcg;bcg) refers to the
rm prot when its cost is good, its reported signal is good, and its competitors reported
cost is good.
With conservatively-biased accounting signal, there are 6 possible levels of rm prot:
1. With probability 22, rm i has good cost, reports good cost and its competitor also
reports good cost. The rms prot is  (cg;bcg;bcg) = (a cg)29 . This prot is the same as
that under the unbiased accounting system when both rms have good costs. This is
6Note the total expected production quantities when there is perfect information and when there is
symmetric imperfect information (when rms do not even know their own cost realization) are the same,
but the total expected rm prots is higher when there is perfect information.
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because good signal is fully informative under conservative accounting system. Thus
when both rms send out good cost signals, they both know their competitorscosts
are truly good.
2. With probability 2(1  ), rm i has good cost, reports bad cost and its competitor
reports good cost. The rms prot is then  (cg;bcb;bcg) = (2(a cg) (cb cg))236 , with  =
1 
(1 )+(1 ) .
3. With probability (1   ), rm i has bad cost, reports bad cost and its competitor
reports good cost. The rms prot is then  (cb;bcb;bcg) = (2(a cb) (1+)(cb cg))236 .
4. With probability  (1  ), rm i has good cost, reports good cost and its competitor
reports bad cost. The rms prot is then  (cg;bcg;bcb) = (2(a cg)+2(cb cg))236 .
5. With probability (1   ) (1  ), rm i has good cost, reports bad cost and its
competitor reports bad cost. The rms prot is then  (cg;bcb;bcb) = (2(a cg)+(cb cg))236 .
6. With probability (1  ) (1  ), rm i has bad cost, reports bad cost and its com-
petitor reports bad cost. The rms prot is then  (cb;bcb;bcb) = (2(a cb) (1 )(cb cg))236 .
The expected rm prot E (con:)is the weighted-average of above rm prots.
C. Agressive Accounting System
Under an aggressive accounting system, the rms must report good cost when the true
cost is good. But when the true cost is bad, the rm may report bad cost with probability
 and report good cost with probability 1  . There are also 6 possible levels of rm prot:
1. With probability  ( +    ), rm i has good cost, reports good cost and its com-
petitor also reports good cost. The rms prot is  (cg;bcg;bcg) = (2(a cg)+(1 )(cb cg))236b ,
with  = 
+((1 )) .
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2. With probability (1  ) (1  ), rm i has good cost, reports good cost and its com-
petitor reports bad cost. The rms prot is then  (cg;bcg;bcb) = (2(a cg)+(1+)(cb cg))236b .
3. With probability  (1  ) ( +    ), rm i has bad cost, reports good cost and its
competitor reports good cost. The rms prot is then  (cb;bcg;bcg) = (2(a cb) (cb cg))236b .
4. With probability (1  )2  (1  ), rm i has bad cost, reports good cost and its com-
petitor reports bad cost. The rms prot is then  (cb;bcg;bcb) = (2(a cb)+(cb cg))236b .
5. With probability (1  ) (1  ) ( +    ), rm i has bad cost, reports bad cost and
its competitor reports good cost. The rms prot is then (cb;bcb;bcg) = (2(a cb) 2(cb cg))236b .
6. With probability (1  )2 (1  )2, rm i has bad cost, reports bad cost and its com-
petitor reports bad cost. The rms prot is then  (cb;bcb;bcb) = (a cb)29b .This prot is the
same as that under the unbiased accounting system when both rms have bad costs.
This is because bad signal is fully informative under aggressive accounting system.
Thus when both rms send out bad cost signals, they both know their competitors
costs are truly bad.
Again, the total expected rm prot E(agg:) is just the weighted average of the values
outlined above.
By examining the rmspayo¤s, it is obvious that the rms would always prefer to
report good signal even when its true cost is bad. Thus under aggressive accounting system,
the competing rms prefer to report aggressively.
Proposition 1. When rms compete in Cournot fashion in a debt-free world, their prots
under conservative/aggressive accounting systems are strictly lower than that under unbiased
accounting system, and their prots decreases with the level of conservatism/aggressiveness.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that accounting bias decreases the amount of rm prot
in a Cournot setting. The rms thus prefer a less biased accounting regime. The reason
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for the decreased prot is the e¢ ciency loss caused by accounting distortion. Note there
are two scenarios when the rm prot is higher under conservative accounting system than
that under an unbiased accounting system:  (cg;bcg;bcb) and  (cg;bcb;bcb). However, the prots
from the other four scenarios are all lower than that under unbiased accounting system. The
losses thus outweigh the gains.
The following two gures visually demonstrate the e¢ ciency loss due to accounting
distortion.
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A: Conservative bias B: Aggressive bias
 unbiased system; - - - conservative system;    agressive system
Numerical values: =0.5, a=10, cg=1, cb=3.
Figure2: Firm prot level as a function of accounting bias.
IV. Debt Financing
Now we introduce debt into the model. We assume the two competing rms each must
nance their production through a di¤erent creditor. The probability distribution of cost is
ex-ante known to all the players of the game. At time 0, each of the two rms borrows debt
with face value D from its creditor. The cash ow paid out to each rm by the creditor is
I. The rms then disclose their costs generated by their reporting systems.
Absent renegotiation, it can be easily seen that the rms owner will always prefer to
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continue the operations, since the payo¤ of termination is 0. However, the creditors will only
prefer to continue when the payo¤ of continuing is higher than liquidation value K, which
represents the depreciated rm assets at time 2. Note the creditors never have incentive to
discontinue the operations if K is su¢ ciently small. Thus here we assume K is large enough
to guarantee a more interesting story involving possible liquidation. When a good signal
is reported, the rms decision rights reside with the rms owner who will continue the
rms operations. When a bad signal is reported, the rms decision rights transfer to the
creditor who may choose to liquidate. The payo¤s for the banks and the borrowing rms are
determined at the end of the timeline. When a rm reports a good signal, and hence does
not violate the debt covenant, the bank gets minfD; g and the rm gets maxf0;  Dg.
When a rm reports bad signal and is terminated by the bank, the bank gets the liquidation
value K and the rm gets 0. When a rm reports bad signal but is allowed to continue by
the bank, the bank gets  and the rm gets 0.
A. Unbiased Accounting System
We rst examine the rm payo¤s under an unbiased accounting system. We assume
the rmsliquidation value K is higher than the prot level of a rm with bad cost that
competes in the Cournot market. That is, K > c (cb; cb) > c (cb; cg). (The subscript "c"
denotes Cournot competition.) Thus the bank will always choose to discontinue the rms
operation whenever the rms reported cost is bad.
An interesting consequence emerges when one rm reports good signal and the other bad
signal. The rm with bad signal is liquidated, and the remaining rm becomes a monopolist,
with a prot even higher than when both rms have good cost. That is, m (cg) > c (cg;cg).
(Here the subscript "m" denotes monopoly market.) The payo¤table for the banks and rms
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is shown below:
Bank 1; 2
Firm 1; 2
Prob. =  Prob. = 1  
Prob. = 
D;D
c (cg;cg) D; c (cg;cg) D
D;K
m (cg) D; 0
Prob. = 1   K;D
0; m (cg) D
K;K
0; 0
Table 1. Payo¤s of banks/rms under unbiased accounting system
Each banks expected payo¤ is
(2) 2D + (1  )2K + (1  ) (D +K) = K  K + D:
With the banks zero prot constraint, we know K  K+ D = I, and thus D = I K

+K:
Firm is expected payo¤ is
(3) 2 (c (cg; cg) D) + (1  ) (m (cg) D) ;
where c (cg; cg) =
(a cg)2
9
and m (cg) =
(a cg)2
4
. Thus, rm is expected prot is
E (unb:) = 
2
 
(a  cg)2
9
 D
!
+ (1  )
 
(a  cg)2
4
 D
!
= 2
(a  cg)2
9
+ (1  )(a  cg)
2
4
  (I  K + K)(4)
Banks Decision. The bank has three possible decision choices when receiving a bad
cost report: to always continue, to always liquidate, or liquidate randomly. Obviously, if K
is lower than the rms prot level, then the bank would always choose to let the rm with
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bad cost continue. In that case, the banks payo¤ would then be
(5) 2D + (1  )2 c (cb;cb) + (1  ) (D + c (cb;cg)) :
In the previous section, we assume the liquidation value K is strictly higher than the rm
prot level when its cost is bad. Thus the bank always liquidates a rm when the rm gives a
bad report. However, a complication arises when the cost reports sent out by both rms are
bad. If one bank chooses to let its borrowing rm continue, while the other bank liquidates
the other borrowing rm, the remaining rm would turn into a monopolist and generates
a prot m (cb) that could be higher than K. When m (cb) > K, the banks could use a
random strategy in liquidating the borrowing rms and improve the payo¤s for all players.
Lemma 2. Under an unbiased accounting system, when both rms report bad cost, and when
m (cb) > K, the banks may let their borrowing rms continue operating with probability
m(cb) K
m(cb) c(cb;cb) to improve the total welfare of all players.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 demonstrates the exibility a competitive product market provides to the
creditors of the rms competing in the market. Even when both rms are in bad condition,
the random termination of one rm softens competition, thus give the remaining rm a
chance to be protable again. The optimal probability of liquidation is simply the usual
ratio between the di¤erence in payo¤s induced by di¤erent decisions. Since the banks are
assumed to earn zero prot, any gain from the random liquidation would be transferred to
the borrowing rms in reduced interest rates. The random liquidation strategy thus provides
a Pareto improvement to the payo¤s of all players.7
Note that the e¤ect demonstrated in Lemma 2 is independent of potential accounting
7We do not consider the potential welfare impact to consumers created by the change in product market
structure. It is not immediately clear whether the consumer surplus would increase or decrease. For example,
the random liquidation strategy could potentially improve consumer welfare since it prevents a complete
market shutdown.
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inuence, as there is no bias under unbiased accounting system. We show in the following
section this e¤ect could be amplied when the accounting system is biased. Also note the
increase in number of rms in Cournot competition does not change the qualitative nature
of the result. For simplicity, we include two competing rms in our model. As the number of
rms competing in the same product market increases, the competition becomes more erce.
Nevertheless, the liquidation of one rm still softens the market competition and leaves the
surviving rms better o¤.
B. Conservative Accounting System
Now we switch to the conservative accounting system. Following the same setup as
under the unbiased accounting system, we rst assume banks always liquidate the rms with
a bad cost report. Thus, rms that have good cost but report bad cost under the conservative
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accounting system would also be liquidated.
Bank 1
Bank 2
Prob. =  Prob. = (1  ) Prob. = (1  )
Firm 1
Firm 2
Prob. = 
D
D
c (cg;cg) D
c (cg;cg) D
K
D
0
m (cg) D
K
D
0
m (cg) D
Prob. = (1  )
D
K
m (cg) D
0
K
K
0
0
K
K
0
0
Prob. = (1  )
D
K
m (cg) D
0
K
K
0
0
K
K
0
0
Table 2. Payo¤s of banks/rms under conservative accounting system.
Examining the payo¤ table, we can see the conservative accounting system induces inappro-
priate termination of rms with good cost. The total expected payo¤ to the bank is the
weighted average of above values:
(6) D + (1  )K
This payo¤ is lower than the bank payo¤ under the unbiased accounting system of
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D + (1  )K. With the bank facing the same zero prot constraint, we have
(7) D =
I  K + K

:
Firm is expected prot is
(8) E(con:) = 
22
(a  cg)2
9
+  (1  ) (a  cg)
2
4
  (I  K + K) :
Interestingly, under certain circumstances, the rmsexpected prots under the conser-
vative accounting system could even be higher than that under unbiased accounting system.
Proposition 3. When ( + )

(a cg)2
4
  (a cg)2
9

>

(a cg)2
4
 K

, and  6= 0,  6= 1, the
rmsexpected prots are higher under the conservative accounting system than that under
the unbiased accounting system.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition demonstrates that accounting conservative bias induces two ef-
fects in the expected prots of the Cournot rms. One e¤ect is the increased likelihood
of a rm becoming a monopolist (as shown in Lemma 2). The second e¤ect is the de-
creased chance of survival due to the creditorsexcessive liquidation. When the rst e¤ect
dominates the second, the rms expected prots actually increase when there is an im-
posed conservative bias. Note that the second e¤ect reduces the rm prot by the amount
 (1  ) (m (cg) K). This is because when a rm is liquidated, the creditor still gets
liquidation value K. Since the creditors face zero-prot constraint, any extra value it gains
will be still passed back to the rms through lower interest payments.
In addition, the rms prot under the conservative accounting system depends on some
parameter values.
Corollary 4. Under the conservative accounting system, the rmsprots decrease with the
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degree of accounting conservatism when m (cg)   K > 2 (c (cg;cg)  m (cg)); and in-
crease with the degree of accounting conservatism when m (cg) K > 2 (d (cg;cg)  m (cg)).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind the corollary 4 comes from the debtsrole in changing the compet-
itive nature of the industry. Although a conservative accounting system imposes excessive
liquidation on rms that report a bad cost signal, it turns the surviving rm into a monopo-
list that generates higher prot than a Cournot duopolist. When the di¤erence between the
monopolist prot and duopolist prot is higher than the di¤erence between the monopolist
prot and the liquidation value, higher degree of conservatism actually increases rm prot.
Combining the ndings of Proposition 3 and Corollary 4, we know that the rms
prots under the conservative accounting system could be higher than that under the un-
biased accounting system when (m (cg) K) < ( + ) (m (cg)  c (cg;cg)) : Further,
the rm prots increase as the degree of conservatism increases when m (cg)   K <
2 (m (cg)  c (cg;cg)) :This result is quite di¤erent from the prior literature on the e¤ect
of debt on conservatism, which typically shows conservatism decreases debt e¢ ciency. The
reason for the di¤erent result in our setting is due to the fact that accounting conservatism
can indirectly change the industry structure through the rmsdebt contracts.
BanksLiquidation Decision. Now we examine the creditorsdecision to liquidate
versus to let continue a rm that reports a bad signal. As under the unbiased accounting
system, the liquidation decision largely depends on the value of K. If the banks never
liquidate the rms with bad cost signals, the banks payo¤ is
D + 2(1  )c (cg;bcb;bcg) + (1  ) (1  ) c (cg;bcb;bcb)
+ (1  ) c (cb;bcb;bcg) + (1  ) (1  ) c (cb;bcb;bcb) :(9)
Hence, the necessary condition for the bank to choose to always continue a rm with a
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bad cost signal is for the banks payo¤ to be higher if this rm is continued. That is,
2(1  )c (cg;bcb;bcg) + (1  ) (1  ) c (cg;bcb;bcb)
+ (1  ) c (cb;bcb;bcg) + (1  ) (1  ) c (cb;bcb;bcb)(10)
> (1  )K
Obviously, the smaller the liquidation value K is, the more likely it is the above inequal-
ity will hold. Conversely, when the bank knows the cost report issued by the rm it lends to
is bad, and the cost report the rival rm sends out is good, the bank should always liquidate
the rm if (1  ) c (cg;bcb;bcg) + c (cb;bcb;bcg) < K.
Similar to Lemma 2, the bank could use a random strategy in the liquidation decision
if m (cb) > K, when the cost reports sent out by both rms are bad.
Corollary 5. Under the conservative accounting system,when both rms report bad cost, and
when m (cb) > K, the banks let their borrowing rms continue operating with probability
m(cb)+(1 )m(cg) K
m(cb)+(1 )m(cg) c(cb;bcb;bcb)+(1 )c(cg;bcb;bcb) to improve the total welfare of all players.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of corollary 5 is similar to that of Lemma 2, except that the conservative
bias in the accounting system e¤ectively increases the decision space for the banks. The banks
hence have more exibility in their liquidation decisions to improve the playerspayo¤s.
C. Aggressive accounting system
Now we analyze when there is an aggressive accounting distortion in the rmsreports.
Contrary to the conservative system, the rms must report good cost as good cost, and may
report good or bad when the cost is truly bad. Again we rst examine the payo¤ table of
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the banks and rms.
Bank 1
Bank 2
Prob. = 
Prob. =
(1  ) 
Prob. =
(1  ) (1  )
Firm 1
Firm 2
Prob. = 
D
D
c (cg;bcg; cg) D
c (cg;bcg; cg) D
c(cb;bcg; cg)
D
0
c (cg;bcg; cb) D
K
D
0
m (cg) D
Prob. =
(1  ) 
D
c(cb;bcg; cg)
c (cg;bcg; cb) D
0
c (cb;bcg; cb)
c (cb;bcg; cb)
0
0
K
D
0
m (cb) D
Prob. =
(1  ) (1  )
D
K
m (cg) D
0
D
K
m (cb) D
0
K
K
0
0
Table 3. Payo¤s of banks and rms under aggressive accounting system
Examining the payo¤ table, it is clear the problem under aggressive accounting system
is the inappropriate continuation of rms with bad costs. The total expected payo¤ to the
bank is:
 
 + (1  )2  (1  )D +  (1  ) c(cb;bcg; cg)
+ (1  )2 2c(cb;bcg; cb) + (1  ) (1  )K(11)
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Again, the bankspayo¤s are smaller compared to the bankspayo¤s under the unbiased
accounting system of D + (1  )K, since c(cb;bcg; cg) < K and c(cb;bcg; cb) < K. With
the bank facing the same zero prot constraint, we set the banks payo¤ equal to I and have
(12) D =
 
I    (1  ) c(cb;bcg; cg)  (1  )2 2c(cb;bcg; cb)  (1  ) (1  )K 
 + (1  )2  (1  ) ;
then we have rm is expected prot
E (agg:) = 
2

2 (a  cg) + (1  +((1 ))) (cb   cg)
2
36
+ (1  ) 

2 (a  cg) +

1 + 
+((1 ))

(cb   cg)
2
36b
(13)
+ (1  ) (1  ) (a  cg)
2
4
+ (1  )  (1  ) (a  cb)
2
4
 
0B@ I    (1  )  (2(a cb) 

+((1 )) (cb cg))
2
36b
  (1  )2 2 (2(a cb)+

+((1 )) (cb cg))
2
36b
  (1  ) (1  )K
1CA
Compared to the rms payo¤ under the unbiased accounting system, the rms payo¤
is almost always lower, except that c (cg;bcg; cg) > c (cg; cg) with probability 2.8
Proposition 6. When 2 (c (cg;bcg; cg)  c (cg; cg)) > ((1  )m (cg)  (I  K + K)) 0B@  (1  ) c (cg;bcg; cb) +  (1  ) (1  ) m (cg) + (1  )  (1  ) m (cb)
   I    (1  ) c(cb;bcg; cg)  (1  )2 2c(cb;bcg; cb)  (1  ) (1  )K
1CA, and  6=
0,  6= 1, the rmsexpected prots are higher under aggressive accounting system than that
under unbiased accounting system.
Proof. The result is immediately clear from examining the expected rm prot levels under
unbiased and aggressive accounting systems.
8The prot levels of rms with good costs competing under the agressive accounting system is higher
than under unbiased accounting system. The reason is that under an agressive accounting system, the rms
take into consideration that the rivalsreported good cost may not be true. The competition is thus softened
as both rms lower their production quantities accordingly.
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The above proposition shows that only when  is su¢ ciently large is it possible for
an aggressive accounting system to induce higher prot for the rms than under unbiased
system.
Banksdecision.Without renegotiation, the banks have no way to prevent the prob-
lem of inappropriate continuation of rms with bad costs. The managers of the borrowing
rms, on the other hand, have no incentive to terminate the rms by themselves. Thus there
is no possible correction to the error induced by the aggressive accounting system.
V. One Bank and Two Firms
Now we introduce another scenario where the competing rms borrow from the same
creditor. The change from two creditors to one common creditor is non-trivial. The rms
cost realizations are independent of each other, and the common creditor in our model still
cannot infer one rms cost from the other. However, now the single creditor is able to
manipulate the competitive nature of the market by strategic liquidation. The payo¤s with
one creditor are mostly the same as when there are two banks lending to two rms, but the
bank maximizes its payo¤ from the whole industry rather than from each individual rm.
Therefore, when both rms report bad cost signals, the bank may be better o¤ letting one
rm survive. Especially, when the prot of a monopolist with bad cost m (cb) > K, the
strategic liquidation provides a Pareto improvement on all playerspayo¤s.
A. Unbiased accounting system
We again rst examine the payo¤s under the unbiased accounting system. The payo¤
to the bank is essentially the sum of the two banks in the previous analyses. Examining
the lower right cell of Table 1, in which both rms report bad cost signals, the best the two
banks can do is to use random strategy to liquidate the rms (as described in Lemma 1).
However, when there is one bank lending to both rms, it is able to deterministically let one
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rm liquidate and the other continue as a monopolist. Its payo¤ is thus:
(14) 22D + (1  )2 (K + m (cb)) + 2(1  ) (D +K) :
Since the above must equal the total initial cash investment 2I, we know
(15) D =
2I   (1  )2 m (cb)  (1  )(1 + )K
2
;
which is strictly lower than I (1 )K

if the bank does not perform such random liquidation.
Since the bank faces zero-prot constraint, all the extra prot is transferred to the rms
through lower interest rate. Firm is payo¤ is
2 (d (cg; cg) D) + (1  ) (m (cg) D)(16)
= 2d (cg; cg) + (1  )m (cg)  2I   (1  )
2 m (cb)  (1  )(1 + )K
2
;
which is strictly higher than 2d (cg; cg)+(1 )m (cg) (I  K +K) ; the payo¤ should
such random liquidation not occur.
B. Conservative accounting system
Compared to the unbiased accounting system, the probability of both rms reporting
a bad cost is higher under the conservative accounting system. In fact, the four lower
right cells in Table 2 all contain double liquidations. With one bank lending to both rms,
one liquidation and one monopolist survivor would replace these cells instead. The banks
expected payo¤ would then be:
(17) 2D + 2 (1  )K +  (1  ) (1  ) m (cg) + (1  ) (1  ) m (cb)
This payo¤ is greater than the bank payo¤ under strategic random liquidation. Again
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we compute the face value of the debt:
(18) D =
2I   2 (1  )K    (1  ) (1  ) m (cg)  (1  ) (1  ) m (cb)
2
;
which is smaller than if the bank does not perform the random liquidation.
The rm is expected prot is thus
22c (cg;cg) +  (1  ) m (cg) (19)
2I   2 (1  )K    (1  ) (1  ) m (cg)  (1  ) (1  ) m (cb)
2
C. Aggressive Accounting System
As shown in Table 3, the aggressive accounting system also has one cell where both
rms are liquidated. The single bank that lends to both rms could also replicate the same
strategy to liquidate one rm and turn the surviving rival into a monopolist. However,
the probability of both rms report bad cost is much smaller than that under conservative
system.
The results of above nding is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Under all accounting systems, when two competing rms borrow from one
common bank, the bank may improve the overall payo¤s by turning one of the two rms that
report a bad cost into a surviving monopolist.
Proof. The result is immediately clear from examining the banks/rms payo¤s.
VI. Conclusion
We show accounting biases decrease the expected rm prots when the rms compete in
Cournot product market in a debt-free world. However, some di¤erent results emerge when
debt is introduced into the rmsnancial structure. Specically, when accounting reports
are used for debt covenants, accounting biases a¤ect the likelihood of covenant violation
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and the bankssubsequent liquidation decision. When one of the two rms is terminated,
the other one becomes a monopolist. The surviving rm is then able to capture the entire
market share,making a prot higher than when it competes with a rival rm. We then
demonstrate the rmspayo¤s under the conservative accounting system could be higher
than that under the unbiased accounting system. In addition, the conservative accounting
system provides the creditors with more control by triggering debt covenant violation more
frequently. The creditors can reduce "false positives" by not always terminating rms with
bad reports. Further, the creditors can choose to randomly allow one rm to survive when
both rms report bad signals. The remaining monopolist then generates enough prot to
pay back the debt. With assumption of zero-prot constraint for the bank, the extra gain
from conservative accounting is passed to the rms through decreased interest rates.
Our study shows accounting bias could have a real e¤ect on the rmsoperating de-
cisions through the presence of debt. Accounting is often perceived to be just a distortion
of information, and not have real impact on the economic agentsbehavior. However, the
accounting bias in our setting could change the competitive nature of market in which the
borrowing rms compete.
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Appendix
A Computation of the rm prots in the debt-free world
To compute the expected rm prot, we must compute the rm prots for each of the
six scenarios under both conservative and aggressive systems.
A. With Conservative Bias
Scenario 1: When both rms report good signals.When rm i has good cost,
reports good cost and its competitor rm j also reports good cost, we know both rms must
be reporting truthfully, since  = 1. That is, both rms must have the same true cost
and same reported cost. Thus the problem reduces to a standard Cournot game. Firm i
objective function is:
(A1) qi (cg;bcg;bcg) (a  qi (cg;bcg;bcg)  qj (cg;bcg;bcg)  cg) :
Firm jobjective function is:
(A2) qj (cg;bcg;bcg) (a  qj (cg;bcg;bcg)  qi (cg;bcg;bcg)  cg) :
Both rms maximize their prot functions over q. Setting the two FOCs equal to zero
and solve for qi and qj , we have:
(A3) qi (cg;bcg;bcg) = qj (cg;bcg;bcg) = a  cg
3
:
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Substitute into the prot function, we have:
(A4) c (cg;bcg;bcg) = (a  cg)2
9
:
Scenarios 2, 3 and 4: When one rm reports good signal and one rm reports
bad signal. Suppose rm i reports a good signal and rm j reports a bad signal. Firm i
must have true good cost. Firm j could have true bad cost or have good cost but report a
bad cost. The three FOCs are:
(A5) qj (cg;bcb;bcg) = a  cg   qi (cg;bcg;bcb)
2
(A6) qj (cb;bcb;bcg) = a  cb   qi (cg;bcg;bcb)
2
(A7) qi (cg;bcg;bcb) = a  cg   (qj (cb;bcb;bcg) + (1  ) qj (cg;bcb;bcg))
2
Solving for the three unknowns and applying symmetry, we have:
(A8) q (cg;bcg;bcb) = 2 (a  cg) + 2 (cb   cg)
6
(A9) q (cg;bcb;bcg) = 2(a  cg)  (cb   cg)
6
(A10) q (cb;bcb;bcg) = 2 (a  cb)  (1 + ) (cb   cg)
6
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The corresponding rm prots are:
(A11)  (cg;bcg;bcb) = (2 (a  cg) + 2 (cb   cg))2
36
(A12)  (cg;bcb;bcg) = (2(a  cg)  (cb   cg))2
36
(A13)  (cb;bcb;bcg) = (2 (a  cb)  (1 + ) (cb   cg))2
36
Scenarios 5 and 6: When both rms report bad signals.When two bad signals
are reported, the competing rms have symmetric imperfect information. Each rm must
take into consideration that the competitor could have truly bad cost, or have good cost
but report bad. Firm i maximizes its prot by choosing production quantity qi so that
@
@qi
(qi(a  qi   E (qj)  ci) = 0, where E(qj) = qj (cb;bcb;bcb) + (1  ) qj (cg;bcb;bcb). Firm j
does the same. Applying symmetry, we have the following four equations:
(A14) qi (cb;bcb;bcb) = 1
2
(a  cb   qj (cb;bcb;bcb)  (1  ) qj (cg;bcb;bcb))
(A15) qi (cg;bcb;bcb) = 1
2
(a  cg   qj (cb;bcb;bcb)  (1  ) qj (cg;bcb;bcb))
(A16) qj (cb;bcb;bcb) = 1
2
(a  cb   qi (cb;bcb;bcb)  (1  ) qi (cg;bcb;bcb))
(A17) qj (cg;bcb;bcb) = 1
2
(a  cg   qi (cb;bcb;bcb)  (1  ) qi (cg;bcb;bcb))
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Solving the four equations and applying symmetry, we have:
(A18) q (cg;bcb;bcb) = 2 (a  cg) + (cb   cg)
6
(A19) q (cb;bcb;bcb) = 2 (a  cb)  (1  ) (cb   cg)
6
Firm is prot is:
(A20)  (cg;bcb;bcb) = (2(a  cg) +  (cb   cg))2
36
(A21)  (cb;bcb;bcb) = (2(a  cb)  (1  ) (cb   cg))2
36
B. With Aggressive Bias
Scenarios 1 and 2: when both rms report good signals.When two good
signals are reported, the rms could have truly good cost, or have bad cost but report good.
Thus, rm is objective function is qi(a   qi   E (qj)   ci, where E(qj) = qj (cg;bcg;bcg) +
(1  ) qj (cb;bcg;bcg). Firm j does the same. Applying symmetry, we have 4 equations:
(A22) qi (cg;bcg;bcg) = 1
2
(a  cg   qj (cg;bcg;bcg)  (1  ) qj (cb;bcg;bcg))
(A23) qi (cb;bcg;bcg) = 1
2
(a  cb   qj (cg;bcg;bcg)  (1  ) qj (cb;bcg;bcg))
(A24) qj (cg;bcg;bcg) = 1
2
(a  cg   qi (cg;bcg;bcg)  (1  ) qi (cb;bcg;bcg))
32
(A25) qj (cb;bcg;bcg) = 1
2
(a  cb   qi (cg;bcg;bcg)  (1  ) qi (cb;bcg;bcg))
Solving the four equations and applying symmetry, we have:
(A26) q (cg;bcg;bcg) = 2 (a  cg) + (1  ) (cb   cg)
6
(A27) q (cb;bcg;bcg) = 2 (a  cb)   (cb   cg)
6
Firm is prot is:
(A28)  (cg;bcg;bcg) = (2 (a  cg) + (1  ) (cb   cg))2
36
(A29)  (cb;bcg;bcg) = (2 (a  cb)   (cb   cg))2
36
Scenarios 3, 4 and 5: When one rm reports a good signal and one rm
reports a bad signal. Let rm i report a good signal and rm j report a bad signal.
Firm i could have true good cost or have bad cost but report good cost. Firm j must have
true bad cost. The three FOCs are:
(A30) qi (cg;bcg;bcb) = a  cg   qj (cb;bcb;bcg)
2
(A31) qi (cb;bcg;bcb) = a  cb   qj (cb;bcb;bcg)
2
(A32) qj (cb;bcb;bcg) = a  cg   (qi (cg;bcg;bcb) + (1  ) qi (cb;bcg;bcb))
2
33
Solving for the three unknowns and applying symmetry, we have:
(A33) q (cg;bcg;bcb) = 2 (a  cg) + (1 + ) (cb   cg)
6
(A34) q (cb;bcg;bcb) = 2(a  cb) + (cb   cg)
6
(A35) q (cb;bcb;bcg) = 2 (a  cb)  2 (cb   cg)
6
And the corresponding rm prots are:
(A36)  (cg;bcg;bcb) = (2 (a  cg) + (1 + ) (cb   cg))2
36
(A37)  (cb;bcg;bcb) = (2(a  cb) + (cb   cg))2
36
(A38)  (cb;bcb;bcg) = (2 (a  cb)  2 (cb   cg))2
36
Scenario 6: When both rms report bad signals. Under aggressive accounting
system, the rms must have truly bad cost when they both report bad signals. Thus again
the problem reduces to a standard Cournot game. Firm is FOC is:
(A39) qi (cb;bcb;bcb) = qj (cb;bcb;bcb) = a  cb
3
:
Substituting into the prot function, we have:
(A40)  (cb;bcb;bcb) = (a  cb)2
9
:
34
B Proof of Proposition 1
The expected payo¤s of rm i in three di¤erent accounting systems are listed below.
Unbiased system:
E(unb:) = 
2 (a  cg)2
9
+ (1  )2 (a  cb)
2
9
(B1)
+(1  )((a  cg) + (cb   cg))
2
9
+ (1  ) ((a  cb)  (cb   cg))
2
9
Conservative system:
E(con:) = 
22
(a  cg)2
9
+ (1  )

2(a  cg)  1 (1 )+(1 )(cb   cg)
2
36
+ ((1  ) + (1  ))

2 (a  cg) + 2 1 (1 )+(1 ) (cb   cg)
2
36
+(1  ) ((1  ) + (1  ))

2(a  cg) + 1 (1 )+(1 ) (cb   cg)
2
36
+ (1  )

2 (a  cb) 

1 + 1 
(1 )+(1 )

(cb   cg)
2
36
(B2)
+ (1  ) ((1  ) + (1  ))

2(a  cb) 

1  1 
(1 )+(1 )

(cb   cg)
2
36
35
Aggressive system:
E(agg:) =
 
2 +  (1  ) 

2 (a  cg) + (1  +((1 ))) (cb   cg)
2
36
+ (1  ) (1  )

2 (a  cg) +

1 + 
+((1 ))

(cb   cg)
2
36
+
 
(1  ) + (1  )2 2

2 (a  cb)  +((1 )) (cb   cg)
2
36
(B3)
+ (1  )  (1  ) (1  )

2(a  cb) + +((1 ))(cb   cg)
2
36
+ ( (1  ) (1  ) + (1  )  (1  ) (1  ))

2 (a  cb)  2 +((1 )) (cb   cg)
2
36
+ (1  )2 (1  )2 (a  cb)
2
9
To compute the di¤erence in these prots, we subtract the conservative/aggressive prot
from the unbiased prot.
(B4) E(unb:)  E(con:) = 11
36
 (cb   cg)2 (1  ) 1  
1   > 0
(B5) E(unb:)  E(agg:) = 11
36
 (cb   cg)2 1  
 +     > 0
Thus we know the prot level under unbiased accounting system is always higher than
that under conservative/aggressive accounting system.
To demonstrate the relationship between the rm prot and the level of conserva-
tive/aggressive bias, we take the partial derivative of rm is prot w.r.t.  and .
(B6)
@
@
E(con:) =
11
36
 (cb   cg)2 (   1)
2
(   1)2 > 0
36
(B7)
@
@
E(agg:) =
11
36
2 (cb   cg)2    1
( +    )2 < 0
It is clear that the higher level of bias is, the lower the rm prot.
C Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose bank 1 let the borrowing rm continue with bad cost report with probability
x, and bank 2 does so with probability y. Then bank 1 should have the following program:
(C1) max xyc (cb;cb) + x (1  y) m (cb) + (1  x)K
Taking the rst order condition, we have:
@
@x
(xyc (cb;cb) + x (1  y) m (cb) + (1  x)K)(C2)
= m (cb) K + yc (cb; cb)  ym (cb) = 0
Solving for y, we have:
(C3) y =
m (cb) K
m (cb)  c (cb; cb) :
D Proof of Proposition 3
The rmsexpected prots under unbiased accounting system are
(D1) 2c (cg;cg) + (1  )m (cg)  (I  K + K) :
The rmsexpected prots under conservative accounting system are
(D2) 22c (cg;cg) +  (1  ) m (cg)  (I  K + K) :
37
Taking the di¤erence between these two expected prots, we have
22c (cg;cg) +  (1  ) m (cg)  (I  K + K)
   2c (cg;cg) + (1  )m (cg)  (I  K + K)(D3)
=  (1  ) (( + ) (m (cg)  c (cg;cg))  (m (cg) K)) :
We know m (cg) =
(a cg)2
4
> c (cg;cg) =
(a cg)2
9
> K. Thus the above value will be strictly
positive when ( + ) (m (cg)  c (cg;cg)) > (m (cg) K).
E Proof of Corollary 4
We examine the change of the rms prot in . Taking the partial derivative, we have
@
@
 
22c (cg;cg) +  (1  ) m (cg)  (I  K + K)

(E1)
=  ((m (cg) K) + 2 (c (cg;cg)  m (cg))) :
Clearly the rmsprots will increase in  if m (cg) K > 2 (m (cg)  c (cg;cg)), which
means less conservatism leads to higher prot. However, ifm (cg) K < 2 (m (cg)  c (cg;cg)),
the rmsprots will decrease in , which means higher conservatism leads to higher prot.
F Proof of Corollary 5
Suppose the bank let the borrowing rm continue with probability x. Then it will have
the following program:
max
x
xy (c (cb;bcb;bcb) + (1  ) c (cg;bcb;bcb))(F1)
+x (1  y) (m (cb) + (1  ) m (cg)) + (1  x)K
38
Setting the FOC = 0 and solving for y, we obtain
(F2) y =
m (cb) + (1  ) m (cg) K
m (cb) + (1  ) m (cg)  c (cb;bcb;bcb) + (1  ) c (cg;bcb;bcb) :
39
